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Abstract 
 
People frequently imagine specific interpersonal experiences that might occur in 
their futures. The present study used a novel experimental paradigm to examine the 
influence of repeated simulation of future interpersonal experiences on subjective 
assessments of plausibility for positive, negative, and neutral events. The results 
demonstrate that repeated simulation increases estimates of plausibility for emotional, but 
not neutral, future interpersonal experiences. Additional correlational analyses reveal that 
increases in plausibility for emotional events are associated with concurrent increases in 
ease of simulation, event detail, and arousal. Implications for daily life and affective 
disorders such as depression and anxiety are noted. 
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In everyday life, people frequently imagine or simulate experiences that might 
occur in their personal futures, and these simulated experiences tend to revolve around 
anticipated interactions with others (D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van Der Linden, 2011; 
for recent reviews, see Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Szpunar, 2010). While 
simulating future interpersonal experiences can help people to prepare for and cope with 
upcoming situations (Taylor, 1991; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Schacter, 
2012), little is known about the associated cognitive consequences. We are specifically 
interested in whether the act of repeatedly simulating an upcoming interpersonal 
experience, such as a meeting, social gathering, job interview, or first date, influences 
beliefs about what will actually take place in one’s personal future. 
Although no study has addressed this specific question, prior research has 
demonstrated that simulating future outcomes of hypothetical events leads those 
outcomes to feel subjectively more likely, and that this relation can be strengthened via 
repetition. For instance, Carroll (1978) found that people who had imagined 
circumstances under which Jimmy Carter (or Gerald Ford) might win the 1976 
Presidential election were more likely to predict that Carter (or Ford) would win the 
election. This initial demonstration was later extended to personal events. Various 
experiments showed that people who imagined committing a crime, winning a prize, or 
contracting a disease, later estimated that they were more likely to experience similar 
events in the future than people who had not imagined those events (Gregory, Cialdini, & 
Carpenter, 1982; Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985). Further, 
Anderson (1983) demonstrated that the more often people imagined performing some Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  4	 ﾠ
action (e.g., donating blood), the more likely they were to believe that they would carry 
out that action in the future. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which prior research informs our understanding of the 
relation between repeated simulation and beliefs about future interpersonal experiences is 
limited in a number of respects. Simulations of personal future experiences, including 
future interpersonal interactions, require individuals to generate specific episodes that 
revolve around their interactions with familiar people, places, and objects (Atance & 
O’Neill, 2001; Szpunar, 2010). Although a number of previous studies linking simulation 
to perceived likelihood focused on personal events, those studies either did not require 
participants to generate their own events (Gregory et al., 1982) or did not require 
participants to simulate specific episodes (Sherman et al., 1985). Moreover, although 
Anderson (1983) examined the effects of repeated simulation on perceived likelihood, 
participants in those experiments were explicitly instructed to avoid simulating the exact 
same event more than once (p. 296). Hence, no study has examined the effects of 
repeatedly simulating the same episode on subjective assessments of future occurrence. 
The purposes of our study were threefold. First, we examined the effects of 
repeated simulation on estimates of perceived plausibility for future interpersonal 
experiences. To control for the influence of prior experience on beliefs related to future 
occurrence, we employed a recently developed paradigm that allowed us to ensure that 
participants simulated novel future events (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; 
Martin, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2011; Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 2012). 
Specifically, participants simulated personal future events that involved interacting with 
familiar people in the context of familiar places and objects. Each event was simulated Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  5	 ﾠ
either once or four times, and participants rated how plausible it was that each experience 
could take place in their futures. We asked participants to rate the plausibility, rather than 
likelihood, of occurrence in order to avoid potential floor effects that might arise from 
asking participants to simulate novel events (e.g., Gregory et al., 1982). 
Second, we examined whether the emotional tone associated with simulated 
future interpersonal experiences would influence the relation between repeated 
simulation and perceived plausibility. Simulations of personal future events are often 
characterized by emotional arousal (D’Argembeau et al., 2011), yet next to nothing is 
known about the effects of repeatedly simulating emotionally arousing events. 
Accordingly, participants in the present study simulated future interpersonal experiences 
that evoked positive emotions, negative emotions, or were emotionally neutral. 
Third, the relation between repeated simulation and perceived likelihood has 
previously been attributed to the ease with which repeatedly simulated events come to 
mind (Anderson, 1983). However, no study has presented evidence for this assertion. 
Hence, it is not clear whether the relation between repeated simulation and perceived 
likelihood can be attributed to the subjective ease with which events come to mind 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), the subjective details associated with those events 
(Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fishhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978), a combination of these 
factors, or perhaps the influence of some other factors. In order to identify what features 
of simulated personal future events might be related to increases in plausibility, 
participants in the present study were required to provide a number of additional 
phenomenological ratings including, valence, ease, detail, and arousal. 
Method Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  6	 ﾠ
Participants 
 
Thirty Boston University students were recruited via the Boston University Job 
Service. They provided informed written consent in a manner approved by Harvard’s 
institutional review board. 
Materials and Procedure 
 
Participants first visited the laboratory for approximately 2 hr to generate lists of 
110 familiar people (first and last names; participants were allowed to login to their 
Facebook accounts and select names from their friend list), 110 familiar locations 
(specific locations that participants had previously visited, e.g., “Fenway Park” was an 
example of an acceptable location, whereas “Boston” was too general), and 110 familiar 
objects that participants could easily imagine having with them in a variety of locations 
(e.g., “cell phone” was an example of an acceptable object, whereas “couch” was too 
rigid). These lists were subsequently examined for quality based on the criteria noted 
above; we selected the 93 best examples of people, the 93 best examples of locations, and 
the 93 best examples of objects from each list, and randomly combined them to create 93 
simulation cues (i.e., random combinations of person-location-object triads). One week 
later, participants returned for approximately 1 hr to simulate 30 positive, 30 negative, 
and 30 neutral future interpersonal experiences (in random order). On each of the 90 
trials, participants were presented with one of three emotion tags (positive, negative, or 
neutral) that was accompanied by a unique simulation cue (i.e., a person-location-object 
triad) (cf. Szpunar et al., 2012). Participants were allotted 12.5 s to simulate a plausible 
future interpersonal experience that evoked the emotion indicated by the emotion tag and 
that involved the person, location, and object specified by the simulation cue (i.e., Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  7	 ﾠ
“imagine a future scenario that would evoke a positive/negative/neutral emotion from 
you in which you are interacting with the specified person, in the specified location, and 
that involves the specified object”). Participants were instructed that the simulated events 
should take place within the next 5 years. At the end of each trial, participants were 
prompted to type a one-sentence summary description of the future experience. 
To ensure that participants understood all instructions, we conducted three 
practice trials in which participants simulated future interpersonal experiences, described 
the content of their simulations to the experimenter, and typed the corresponding 
summary descriptions. During experimental trials, participants were only required to 
simulate future interpersonal experiences and type the corresponding summary 
descriptions. After the experimental trials, all participants reported that their simulations 
were novel (i.e., the participants had not thought about or experienced the simulations 
prior to the experiment). Materials were presented with E-Prime software Version 1.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on a Dell desktop computer, and 
participants used a keyboard to type their summary descriptions. 
  One day later, participants returned for 1.5 hr to re-simulate half (i.e., 15 positive, 
15 negative, and 15 neutral) of the previously generated events three times each (in 
random order). Each of the 135 trials were performed according to the above parameters 
for experimental trials, except that participants’ summary descriptions were now 
presented along with the emotion tags and person-location-object triads. Participants 
were instructed to simulate each event as they had the day before without generating 
additional details, and participants subsequently reported that the summary descriptions 
enabled them to follow this instruction. Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  8	 ﾠ
After a 10 min break, participants re-simulated all 90 of the originally generated 
events (30 positive, 30 negative, and 30 neutral; simulated in random order), so that 
future experiences were simulated for the first or fourth time that day. After each of these 
90 trials, participants were first asked to specify whether or not the future experience had 
been simulated earlier that day (i.e., 10 min ago), and then completed five 5-point 
phenomenological ratings [valence (1 = very negative, 5 = very positive), ease (1 = very 
difficult, 5 = very easy), detail (1 = few details, 5 = many details), arousal (1 = very 
calming, 5 = very arousing), and most critically, plausibility (1 = very implausible, 5 = 
very plausible); presented in a new random order for each participant]. Participants used a 
keyboard to make their memory judgments (yes/no recognition) and phenomenological 
ratings. Post-experiment interviews indicated that the memory test (Hits – FA = .99) and 
additional ratings successfully obscured the true purpose of the experiment (i.e., to 
examine the influence of repeated simulation on plausibility). 
It is important to highlight that using distinct sets of items to examine the 
influence of repeated simulation on judgments of future occurrence introduced an 
important advantage and limitation to the present design. With regard to the advantage, 
asking participants to rate the plausibility (and other phenomenological characteristics) of 
each event only once (i.e., following the first simulation for some events and the fourth 
simulation for other events) helped to avoid potential biases that might have arisen had 
participants been asked to rate the same events across multiple simulations (e.g., under 
such circumstances previous ratings of individual events might influence subsequent 
ratings of those same events). However, this important feature of the design also placed 
limitations on our ability to elucidate how other characteristics of future event simulation Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  9	 ﾠ
might help to account for the influence of repeated simulation on ratings of plausibility. 
Specifically, because different events were simulated once or four times, changes in 
phenomenological characteristics as a function of repetition could not be calculated for 
individual events. Nonetheless, changes in phenomenological characteristics could be 
calculated for individual subjects, and we elaborate further on this point in the following 
section. 
Lastly, it is important to note that although participants simulated distinct sets of 
events once or four times on the day that phenomenological ratings were collected, each 
event had been simulated once the day before, when brief descriptions of these events 
were originally generated. Hence, distinct sets of events were simulated twice or five 
times in total, but once or four times on the day of the critical manipulation. 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents the mean phenomenological ratings for positive, negative, and 
neutral simulations of future interpersonal experiences as a function of event repetition. 
Repeated measures analyses of variance
1 demonstrated a strong effect of repetition across 
each rating scale such that future interpersonal experiences simulated four times were 
rated as more plausible, positive, easy to generate, detailed, and arousing than future 
interpersonal experiences simulated once [smallest F (1,29) = 16.66, p < .001, Бp
2 = 
.365]. There was also a strong effect of emotion for ratings of valence [F (2,58) = 176.42, 
p < .001, Бp
2 = .859], detail [F (2,58) = 3.58, p = .034, Бp
2 = .110], and arousal [F (2,58) 
= 53.38, p < .001, Бp
2 = .648]. Specifically, positive and negative events were 
respectively rated as more positive [t(29) = 7.03, p < .001, d = 1.31] and negative [t(29) = 
14.55, p < .001, d = 2.71] than neutral events. Moreover, positive and negative events Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  10	 ﾠ
were rated as more detailed than neutral events [t(29) = 2.26, p = .032, d = 0.41 and t(29) 
= 2.24, p = .033, d = 0.41, respectively], whereas positive and negative events did not 
differ in terms of detail (t < 1). Finally, negative events were rated as more arousing than 
positive [t(29) = 5.00, p < .001, d = 0.94] and neutral [t(29) = 8.59, p < .001, d = 1.58] 
events, and positive events were rated as more arousing than neutral events [t(29) = 6.38, 
p < .001, d = 1.16]. 
Notably, repetition interacted with emotion on each phenomenological scale 
[smallest F (2,58) = 3.19, p = .048, Бp
2 = .099]. With regard to plausibility, future 
interpersonal experiences simulated four times were rated as more plausible than future 
interpersonal experiences simulated once for positive [t(29) = 3.94, p < .001, d = 0.72] 
and negative [t(29) = 4.89, p < .001, d = 0.89] events, but not for neutral events [t(29) = 
1.09, ns]. Similarly, ratings of ease, detail, and arousal demonstrated greater increases 
across repeated simulations for positive and negative events than for neutral events 
[smallest F (1,29) = 4.16, p = .050, Бp
2 = .125]. For ratings of valence [F (2,58) = 16.22, 
p < .001, Бp
2 = .359], positive events simulated four times were rated as more positive 
than positive events simulated once [t(29) = 5.28, p < .001, d = 1.00], whereas no change 
in valence was observed for negative and neutral events (ts < 1). 
Finally, we examined the extent to which increases in plausibility for emotional 
(i.e., positive and negative) simulations of future interpersonal experiences were 
associated with concurrent increases in the four remaining phenomenological scales. As 
we alluded to in the previous section, the experimental design did not allow changes in 
phenomenological characteristics as a function of repetition to be calculated for 
individual events (i.e., different subsets of events had been simulated once or four times). Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  11	 ﾠ
Instead, average changes in each phenomenological characteristic as a function of 
repetition were calculated for each subject (i.e., average for events simulated four times 
relative to average for events simulated once). These average change scores were then 
used to correlate the magnitude of change in plausibility ratings with the magnitudes of 
change in valence, ease, detail, and arousal. Although the results of these analyses should 
be interpreted with some caution, increases in plausibility were found to be significantly 
correlated with concurrent increases in ease (r = .42, N = 30, p = .022), detail (r = .38, N 
= 30, p = .039), and arousal (r = .59, N = 30, p = .001), but not with changes in valence.
2 
Moreover, the strength of these correlations did not differ as a function of valence (i.e., 
between positive and negative simulations; see Raghunathan, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1996 
for discussion of comparing correlations).
 
General Discussion 
  We examined the relation between repeated simulation of future interpersonal 
experiences and judgments of plausibility. Our findings are notable in three respects: (1) 
repeated simulation increased the perceived plausibility of future interpersonal 
experiences, (2) this effect was only evident for emotional events, and (3) increases in 
plausibility for emotional events were associated with concurrent increases in ease of 
simulation, event detail, and arousal.  
The finding that future interpersonal experiences simulated four times were 
perceived as more plausible than future interpersonal experiences simulated once fits well 
with prior research demonstrating similar effects for nonpersonal or general personal 
events (Anderson, 1983; Carroll, 1978; Gregory et al., 1982; Sherman et al., 1985). 
Moreover, the influence of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of future Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  12	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interpersonal experiences was only evident for emotional events. After one simulation, 
participants rated positive [t(29) = 2.06, p = .048, d = 0.38] and, to a greater extent, 
negative [t(29) = 3.24, p = .003, d = 0.59] events as less plausible than neutral events. 
Interestingly, this pattern of data similarly emerged when, upon completing the 
experiment, a subset of the participants (N = 15) were asked to estimate what proportion 
of their daily future experiences over the next five years would be characterized by 
positive (38%), negative (18%), and neutral (44%) events. However, after four 
simulations, plausibility ratings for future positive, negative, and neutral interpersonal 
experiences were indistinguishable from one another. 
Why do emotional future interpersonal experiences feel more plausible following 
repeated simulation? Although it has previously been suggested that repeated simulations 
feel more plausible because they come to mind more easily (Anderson, 1983), our results 
suggest that the answer to this question might be more complex. Specifically, we 
demonstrated that increases in plausibility for emotional events were further associated 
with concurrent increases in subjective detail (cf. Lichtenstein et al., 1978) and arousal. 
The association between detail and plausibility fits particularly well with the results of a 
recent study showing that, following brief delays, details of emotionally arousing 
simulations were better remembered than details of emotionally neutral simulations 
(Szpunar et al., 2012). Accordingly, participants in the present study may have better 
retained the details that accumulated across repeated simulations of emotionally arousing 
simulations, which in turn influenced their judgments of plausibility. 
It is noteworthy that increases in subjective detail were observed across repeated 
simulations despite the fact that participants had been explicitly instructed to avoid Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  13	 ﾠ
adding new details. Future research will need to delineate whether, and under what 
circumstances, the increases in subjective detail that accompany repeated simulations are 
related to the addition of new details, the bringing into focus of details associated with the 
original simulation, a combination of these factors, or perhaps some other factors. 
Of course, the data on which our preliminary conclusions are based are 
correlational and future research will need to examine the relation of repeated simulation 
to estimates of perceived plausibility in a manner that directly manipulates various 
features of future event simulation before any causal conclusions can be drawn. To this 
end, experimental designs that examine changes in ratings of plausibility, and other 
phenomenological characteristics, at the level of individual events will be of considerable 
value in developing a more complete understanding of the influence that repeated 
simulation has on beliefs related to future occurrence. Additionally, because the relation 
between repetition and plausibility was specifically associated with emotional 
simulations, it will also be important for future research to examine the extent to which 
variables related to emotionality (e.g., self-relevance) might also help to account for the 
present set of results.
3  
Finally, our results have possibly important implications for understanding 
emotional disorders such as depression and anxiety, where negative expectations for the 
future (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) could be especially heightened by repeated simulations 
of negative events. This process may be particularly acute in patients with anxiety 
disorders, who generate more vivid imagery for negative future scenarios than either 
healthy controls or patients with major depressive disorder (Morina, Deeprose, Pusowski, 
Schmid, & Holmes, 2011). Because our procedure generates many more observations Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  14	 ﾠ
than standard paradigms (cf. Anderson, 1983; Gregory et al., 1982; Sherman et al., 1985), 
we believe that variations of it will be useful for both clinical and experimental studies of 
the effects of repeated simulation on the plausibility of future interpersonal experiences. Simulation of future interpersonal experiences  15	 ﾠ
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Footnotes 
 
1.  Non-parametric analyses, to the extent that appropriate tests were available, were 
also carried out on the present data set, and produced a similar pattern of results. 
2.  We also conducted additional analyses for which: (1) either the change in 
plausibility ratings across repeated simulations or the ratings of plausibility 
following four simulations were treated as the dependent variable, and (2) ratings 
of plausibility following one simulation were treated as a covariate. These 
analyses demonstrated a similar pattern of results (i.e., ratings of plausibility were 
reliably predicted by ratings of ease, detail, and arousal). 
3.  Notably,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠexperiments	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠsimulation	 ﾠto	 ﾠplausibility	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠemotionally	 ﾠarousing	 ﾠscenarios	 ﾠ[e.g.,	 ﾠimagining	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
person	 ﾠ(Anderson,	 ﾠ1983);	 ﾠimagining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠupcoming	 ﾠelection	 ﾠ
(Carroll,	 ﾠ1978);	 ﾠimagining	 ﾠcommitting	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrime	 ﾠor	 ﾠwinning	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrip	 ﾠto	 ﾠHawaii	 ﾠ
(Gregory	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠ1982);	 ﾠor	 ﾠimagining	 ﾠcontracting	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdisease	 ﾠ(Sherman	 ﾠ
et	 ﾠal.,	 ﾠ1985)].	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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Table 1. Mean phenomenological ratings for positive, negative, and neutral simulations 
of future interpersonal experiences as a function of event repetition. Standard deviations 
are presented in parentheses. 
 
	 ﾠ Positive	 ﾠ Negative	 ﾠ Neutral	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
PLAUSIBILITY	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Fourth	 ﾠ 2.81	 ﾠ(.66)	 ﾠ 2.77	 ﾠ(.74)	 ﾠ 2.79	 ﾠ(.76)	 ﾠ
First	 ﾠ 2.47	 ﾠ(.62)	 ﾠ 2.27	 ﾠ(.71)	 ﾠ 2.66	 ﾠ(.68)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
EASE	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Fourth	 ﾠ 4.02	 ﾠ(.69)	 ﾠ 3.98	 ﾠ(.73)	 ﾠ 3.77	 ﾠ(.80)	 ﾠ
First	 ﾠ 3.04	 ﾠ(.71)	 ﾠ 3.04	 ﾠ(.73)	 ﾠ 3.04	 ﾠ(.77)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
DETAIL	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Fourth	 ﾠ 3.49	 ﾠ(.68)	 ﾠ 3.52	 ﾠ(.78)	 ﾠ 3.18	 ﾠ(.72)	 ﾠ
First	 ﾠ 2.72	 ﾠ(.65)	 ﾠ 2.75	 ﾠ(.58)	 ﾠ 2.70	 ﾠ(.63)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
AROUSAL	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Fourth	 ﾠ 2.44	 ﾠ(.51)	 ﾠ 2.85	 ﾠ(.64)	 ﾠ 1.59	 ﾠ(.49)	 ﾠ
First	 ﾠ 2.12	 ﾠ(.51)	 ﾠ 2.53	 ﾠ(.57)	 ﾠ 1.55	 ﾠ(.50)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
VALENCE	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Fourth	 ﾠ 4.04	 ﾠ(.37)	 ﾠ 1.95	 ﾠ(.47)	 ﾠ 3.33	 ﾠ(.28)	 ﾠ
First	 ﾠ 3.61	 ﾠ(.51)	 ﾠ 1.99	 ﾠ(.41)	 ﾠ 3.28	 ﾠ(.36)	 ﾠ
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 ﾠ